The propensity score collapses the covariates of an observational study into a single measure summarizing their joint association with treatment conditions; prognostic scores summarize covariates' association with potential responses.
Introduction
Following Neyman (1923) and Rubin (1977) , let us construe an intervention's effect in terms of potential outcomes, as the differences between subjects' potential responses to treatment, y t , and control, y c . The basic challenge for measurement of effects is that at most one of these two outcomes is observed, according as the subject did (z = 1) or did not (z = 0) in actuality receive the treatment. This difficulty is most conclusively surmounted when the potential outcomes arise through stable, repeatable processes with known chance properties, as in laboratories with highly controlled experimental conditions, and when treatment conditions are decided by a stable, repeatable process with known chance properties, as in field or clinical studies with random assignment to treatment (Holland 1986 ). Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) showed that modelling the observed pattern of treatment (z) as a function of covariates (x = (x 1 , . . . x k ) ) collapses those covariates into a scalar, the propensity score, upon which it is beneficial to condition.
The demonstration requires no ostensible assignment mechanism to exist outside the statistical model, and suggests that even when treatment assignment models are misspecified, propensity-score stratification is likely to reduce bias, if not eliminate it.
Now if casual models of treatment assignment favourably reduce the dimension of x, then dimension reductions of x that arise from modelling p(y c |x) should be favourable as well, either as alternatives or as complements to propensity scores.
Prognostic scores
If Ψ(X) is sufficient for Y c , in the sense that Y c ⊥ X|Ψ(X), say Ψ(X) is a prognostic score. Should Y c follow a shift model, p(y c |x) ≡ f c (y c − h(x)) for some fixed f c , then h(X) is a prognostic score. Should Y c |X follow a generalized linear model (McCullagh and Nelder 1989) , then the linear predictor of Y c given X is a prognostic score, as is the scalar E(Y c |X). The propensity score, E(Z|X), is also a sufficient statistic, sufficient for Z rather than Y c ; whereas propensities are scalars, when Y c is not binary there may be multi-dimensional but not scalar prognostic scores. Should Y c have a linear regression on X, for example, but with non-constant variance that is linear in X, then the regression and variance functions taken together constitute a prognostic score. In prognostic scoring, one fits a model of p(y c |x) to some set of control subjects, extrapolating this fit to intervention and control subjects being compared.
In many settings, information about response in the absence of treatment, Y c , is more available than is data on responses of treated subjects, Y t ; prognostic scores' definition reflects an assumption that this is the case. When the reverse is true, it may be appropriate to attend to sufficient statistics for Y t rather than Y c ; if so, much of what follows remains true provided that controls are relabelled as treatments, and vice versa.
A sufficient statistic for Y c is not necessarily sufficient for Y t . The difference has to do with the possibility that a covariate or function of the covariates modifies the effect of treatment; indeed, it suggests a general perspective on effect modification.
Say there is no effect modification if any prognostic score Ψ(X) is sufficient for Y t as well as Y c ; and say m(X) is an effect modifier if for any prognostic score Ψ(X), (Ψ(X), m(X)) is sufficient for Y t , while at least one prognostic score Ψ(X) is not sufficient for Y t . Effect modification is sometimes identified with the presence of interaction terms involving Z in regression models for pr(Y |Z, X); these definitions support that usage, but also apply when there is no linear predictor in view. They allow that there may be effect modification even when response surfaces for Y t and Y c given X are parallel, if for instance the dispersion of Y t depends on X in a way that Y c 's dispersion does not. Whenever pr(Y t |Y c , X) = pr(Y t |Y c ), on the other hand, there can be no effect modification. Section 2 tracks various implications of effect 3 modification and its absence.
Precedents
Peters (1941), Belson (1956) , Cochran (1969) , Rubin (1984) and Gastwirth and Greenhouse (1995) suggest extractingÊ(Y c |X = x) from a parametric model fit to the control group, then estimating the treatment effect as the treatment group mean Miettinen (1976) proposes regression of Y on Z and X, followed by subclassification on the part of the linear predictor that is free of Z. Zhao (2004) , in a suggestion echoed by Imbens (2004) , proposes matching on a weighted combination of differences in covariates, using separate control-and treatment-group regressions of Y on X to determine the weights.
In contrast with the Peters-Belson and Zhao techniques, the primary aim of prognostic scoring is to reduce the dimension of the covariate; it combines with other techniques, such as matching or propensity scoring. Miettinen's scores sometimes coincide with prognostic scores, although with due attention to issues to be discussed in Section 3, estimated prognostic scores will generally differ from Miettinen's scores.
Prognostic Conditioning: Population Theory

Prognostic balance
Conditioning on the propensity score, φ(x) ≡ E(Z|X = x), secures a form of covariate balance:
X ⊥ Z|φ(X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983, Thm. 1) . Within level sets of the propensity score, no covariate associates with membership in the treatment or the control group. A quintessential benefit of experimental randomization is its tendency to impose this absence of association, here called "propensity balance." An observational study 4 exhibiting propensity balance on scientifically important covariates is experimentlike, in that it resembles a randomized trial in salient observed characteristics.
In a second experimental ideal, it is the process by which outcomes are generated that is repeatable, understood, and carefully controlled, not the process of assigning units to treatment. Studies approaching this ideal use experimental control in the interest of removing associations between covariates and potential outcomes, not treatment assignment. If in advance of studying a new experimental manipulation, an investigator conducts tests absent the new manipulation in order to better understand accompanying conditions and their influence on the outcome, then it is this second ideal that her procedure seeks to attain. Such preparations may incompletely control those non-experimental factors with the potential to influence the outcome of the trial, but they will have succeeded if in their wake uncontrolled variation in such factors does not systematically associate with trial outcomes. Should she subsequently document a systematic association between experimental manipulations and trial outcomes, this will be evidence of a treatment effect.
This form of balance -similarity among the covariate distributions of trials or subjects with contrasting potential outcomes, Y c ⊥ X -is quite distinct from propensity balance, Z ⊥ X. Call it prognostic balance. Principles of sufficiency and of conditional independence support a theory of prognostic balance that parallels Rosenbaum and Rubin's (1983) account of propensity balance, with a few important differences.
Proposition 1 Let Y c be potential response to control. Then Ψ(X) is a prognostic score if and only if conditioning on it induces prognostic balance within domains determined by X -
-where A may be any measurable set.
If m(X) is an effect modifier, then in addition to (1) one has
for all measurable g(·).
Proof of Proposition 1. The 'if' implication is immediate. For the other (1) follows from the definition of a prognostic score.
Proposition 1 supports the checking of prognostic scores on samples from which treatment has been entirely withheld. Since Y c is observed only when Z = 0, it does not suggest any practicable tests for samples containing both control and treatment subjects. For those settings another principle is needed, one that is valid only in the absence of hidden bias, or confounding due to omitted variables: i.e., only when
This added condition marks one noteworthy difference between prognostic and propensity diagnostics: propensity balance can validly be assessed even when important confounders have been omitted. (But note that in that case propensity balance is no longer sufficient for causal inference.)
Proposition 2 In the absence of hidden bias (2), Ψ(X) is a prognostic score if and only if conditioning on it induces prognostic balance over domains determined jointly by X and Z: for any (measurable) A,
2.2 Absence of confounding within prognostically balanced strata Proposition 3 If there is no hidden bias (2), conditioning on a prognostic score deconfounds potential responses from treatment assignment:
for any A. If also Y t ⊥ Z|X, and there is no effect modification, then (for any A)
Proof of Proposition 3. Combining (2) with the defining property of prognostic scores,
The joint distribution of Y c and Z given Ψ(X), then, is expressible as the product of the distribution of Y c given b(X) and a distribution produced by conditioning the propensity score, E(Z|X), on Ψ(X). For the claim about Y t , no effect modification entails this demonstration's validity when Y t is substituted for Y c throughout.
Direct adjustment with prognostic scores
In the absence of hidden bias, by prognostic score subclassification one can estimate treatment's effects upon treatment-group subjects, provided that there is no level of the prognostic subclassification at which subjects receive the treatment with certainty.
This parallels a principle of propensity subclassification, with the difference that in 7 propensity subclassification it is required that there be no level of the unreduced covariate at which subjects receive the treatment with certainty (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman et al. 1998 ). The propensity condition may fail while the weaker condition, on prognostic scores, holds.
Proposition 4 Suppose X deconfounds Y c and Z, Y c ⊥ Z|X, and that with probability one, pr(Z = 1|Ψ(X)) < 1. Then
Proof of Proposition 4. Certainly E(Y |Z = 1, Ψ(X)) = E(Y t |Z = 1, Ψ(X)) and 
while if there is no effect modification then
Proof of Proposition 5. For (5), observe that the initial assumptions entail
, whereas the additional assumptions
When there is no effect modification, m(X) in (5) can be taken to be degenerate, and (6) follows.
Estimating Prognostic Scores: Two Caveats
Like the basic theory of propensity scores (as given by Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983),
Propositions 1-5 refer literally only to unlikely cases in which the form of the score is specifically known. In practice, both propensity and prognostic scores must be approximated, typically through the specification and fitting of a model. One hopes that estimated scores sufficiently like a known score in terms of balance (here, Propositions 1 and 2) will share in known scores' capacity to deconfound treatment effects (Propositions 3-5). As it pertains to propensity scores, the hypothesis has been corroborated in a variety of studies (see e.g. Drake 1993; Dehejia and Wahba 1999; Rubin and Thomas 2000; Kurth et al. 2006; Rubin and Stuart 2006) ; however, propensity balance can be checked for a whole sample, whereas prognostic balance can ordinarily be checked only in the control group. What does this suggest about adjustment with prognostic scores?
The difficulty with same-sample estimation
Overfitting affects both prognostic score and propensity estimation, but the fact that only controls contribute to the estimation of prognostic scores makes overfitting more acute for them, and potentially more consequential. To fix ideas, let there be treatment and control groups of size n = 500, in both of which Y c and X 1 , . . . , X 10 are independent standard Normal, and suppose a propensity score fitted by logistic regression of Z on X, with the prognostic score taken to be the linear regression of Y c on X, as fitted to the control group only. Suppose for now that no additional control observations are available for fitting the prognostic score: this is same-sample estimation. Despite the absence of structural propensity or prognostic relationships, and the fact that neither of these regressions are likely to be declared significant by ordinary F tests with appropriate degrees of freedom, simulation readily verifies that with high probability, sample deciles of the estimated propensity appear significantly to predict membership in the treatment group, and sample deciles of the estimated prognostic score appear significantly to predict controls' y c -values.
These spurious rejections do not in themselves speak against using either technique to test for treatment effects, and indeed in this specific scenario such tests produce false positives no more than they should. By an artifact of regression, at higher deciles of the estimated prognosis controls have atypically high responses, while at lower deciles controls' responses are particularly low. However, the two biases tend to cancel; see the simulation results in Table 1 . When the treatment and control groups are separated, however, so that comparisons of treatment and control subjects are concentrated at one or the other ends of the scale, the two biases need no longer compensate for one another. The potential for inference to be undermined in this way affects the Peters-Belson and Miettinen approaches also, and has been discussed in some detail by Barsky et al. (2002, § 2) , who link it to issues of model misspecification.
Yet it can arise even if the prognostic model is well-specified, as Table 1 shows. In the simulation reported in it, Y s and Xs were again unrelated but the two comparison groups could differ in terms of X; when that difference is substantial, a prognostic adjustment based on same-sample estimation of prognostic scores can be much worse than no adjustment at all. The simulation also shows that the difficulty was mitigated by estimating the scores on a separate sample of controls.
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.04 .05 .18 Table 1 : Type I error rates after stratification on deciles of prognostic scores, as estimated from the same and from a separate sample of controls. Simulation Y c and X 1 , . . . , X 10 data were independent Normals, so that Y c and X had no systematic relationship. The n = 500 controls had X 1 ∼ N (0, 1) and the n = 500 treatments had X 1 ∼ N (0, 1), N (1, 1), or N (5, 1), while in other respects treatments' and controls'
x-values followed the same distribution, so that φ(X) = X 1 . Throughout, Y t was set equal to Y c , propensity scores came from logistic regression of Z on X, prognostic scores were the linear regression predictions of Y c , and the hypothesis that Y t ≡ Y c was tested using a .05-level aligned rank test (Hodges and Lehmann 1963) ; based on 1000 replicates. The results suggest that same-sample estimation of prognostic scores may make inference less reliable, particularly when treatment and control groups are separated.
Should the treatment group contribute to the prognosis for controls?
If difficulties arise when a prognostic score must be extrapolated from a control to a treatment group, a possible solution is to estimate the scores using a model fit to both groups. This solution, however, opens the doors to problems of its own, except in the uncommon event that much is known a priori about pr(Y t |Y c , X). Consider settings such that neither E(Y c |X) nor E(Z|X) is flat, but the true prognostic and propensity scores are unassociated. If treatment increases Y , but the analyst fits a regression ig-noring the distinction between treatments and controls, then the estimated prognosis will tend to be a mixture of the true propensity and prognostic scores. Adjusting for it will tend to compare high propensity, low prognosis treatments to low propensity, high prognosis controls, downwardly biasing estimates of the treatment effect.
In general, the problem is not fixed simply by adding Z to the regression and taking as prognostic score the part of the linear predictor that is free of Z. To take scenario of particular concern in economics (Heckman 1997) , add to the previous assumptions that E(Y t − Y c |X) increases with the propensity to receive treatment. If the investigator fits an outcome regression with only a linear contribution from Z, then again the estimated prognosis will be a mixture of the true prognostic and propensity scores, because high-propensity treatments will tend to have larger y-values than lowpropensity treatment units irrespective of their prognostic scores; again the treatment effect will be obscured. Were they available, checks of prognostic balance over the whole sample would likely reveal such problems. Checks that can be made using only the control group would not necessarily reveal them (although potentially a check for prognostic balance along the estimated propensity score could).
To put the issue in more general terms, true prognostic scores and scores formed by fitting a correct or incorrect model only to controls do not carry information about in certain experiments, and in that in the absence of hidden bias, a score's possessing this balancing property means conditioning on it suffices for causal inference. Several qualifications apply to this implication that would not apply to propensity scores, however: diagnostics for prognostic balance that are available in a given sample are inherently incomplete, in that they address only balance among controls; the fitting of prognostic scores to the sample that is to be adjusted risks introducing bias, in a manner that would not be detected by available balance assessments; using treatment as well as control observations to fit prognostic scores may introduce bias if the pattern of the treatment effect is not known in advance. These difficulties may be substantially avoided if an alternate sample of controls, perhaps historical controls, are available for the determination of the prognostic score, an approach with precedents in casecontrol matching (Silber et al. 2001) . Prognostic balance assessment is an appealing diagnostic for scores of this type.
Whenever conditioning on a prognostic score, Φ(X), purges treatment-control comparisons of confounding due to X, so too does conditioning on that score and any other function of the covariate. When there is effect modification, such conditioning may be needed to estimate
is generally possible without additional conditioning. Another attractive possibility is to match or subclassify on both prognostic and propensity scores; in situations where treatment and control samples are separated on the covariate, this may reduce extrapolation, minimizing the impact of errors of estimation in the prognostic score and of the impossibility of checking prognostic balance in the treatment group.
Because of this impossibility, and because of complications associated with effect modification, adjustment based on prognostic scores tends to require stronger assumptions than propensity adjustment. However, § 2.3 noted one respect in which prognostic adjustment makes weaker assumptions than propensity adjustment: inference after propensity adjustment requires that there be no level of X at which treatment is received with certainty, whereas prognostic adjustment requires only that there be no level of Ψ(X) at which treatment is certain. Regression discontinuity designs (RDs: Campbell and Stanley 1966; Berk and de Leeuw 1999; Hahn et al. 2001 ) are characterized by the presence of a threshold in a covariate that determines eligibility for the treatment, or perhaps compulsion to receive it. This means that pr{pr(Z = 1|X) = 1} > 0, even that pr(Z = 1|X = x) = 1 for most or all xs represented in the treatment group, so propensity adjustment is not possible. However, it does not entail that the treatment group is characterized by pr(Z = 1|Ψ(X) = Ψ(x)) = 1. It may be that after prognostic scoring, some RDs can be deconfounded using propensity techniques. One might begin by constructing a multidimensional score from the fitting of several candidate models to historical controls, diagnosing its suitability in the manner indicated above. This process might be repeated for each of several outcomes of interest, with the results joined into one transformationΨ(X) of the covariate. If observations on either side of the covariate threshold are comparable in respects that matter for the outcomes, then after subclassifying onΨ(X) there should be controls interspersed among the treatment subjects. If so, the analysis could proceed as ifX =Ψ(X), not X, had been the covariate; one might next match or subclassify on a "prognostic propensity," φ(x), alone or in combination with other functions ofx.
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